For months, discussions have erupted in Indian online communities. Critics have asked, “Is this the breakthrough India needs, or a surveillance trap none anticipated?” Public anger grew when early reviewers claimed that Sanchar Saathi gave the government a “backdoor” into millions of personal devices. Screenshots and tweets flooded social media, alleging that the app could scan call logs, access camera usage, and monitor personal activities.
Digital rights activists joined the debate. They argued that no tool designed to prevent fraud should require such extensive permissions. Supporters responded that the fears were exaggerated and based on a misunderstanding of how telecom security apps function. Nevertheless, suspicion remained. The thought of a government-linked app having continuous access to personal data caused widespread anxiety.
Tech forums examined the app in detail. Privacy researchers called for transparency reports. Legal experts questioned whether such intrusions could stand up to constitutional scrutiny given India’s strong privacy laws. While Sanchar Saathi has not been proven harmful, it has certainly ignited a national discussion: Can intrusive technological permissions coexist with the fundamental Right to Privacy?
GOALS OF THE SANCHAR SAATHI APP
The Indian Government promotes Sanchar Saathi as a citizen-focused initiative aimed at reducing telecom-related cybercrimes, including phishing, identity theft, SIM fraud, and spam. Concerns over fake mobile numbers, illegally obtained SIM cards, and the increasing complexity of cyber fraud created a need for better digital security measures.
Key features include:
* CEIR (Central Equipment Identity Register) for blocking stolen phones using IMEI.
* TAFCOP (Telecom Analytics for Fraud Management and Consumer Protection) to identify unauthorized or excessive SIM connections.
* Device verification tools to spot counterfeit or suspicious phones.
The government claims these features improve digital safety, ensure traceable mobile connections, and make fraudulent activities more difficult. It also suggests the platform allows faster investigations, helping authorities track fraudulent devices and SIMs more effectively.
In essence, Sanchar Saathi is seen as a security measure aimed at preventing cyber fraud early by limiting the circulation of unverified devices and SIM cards.
PROS AND CONS OF SANCHAR SAATHI
(1) Pros:
* Allows users to report suspicious calls and messages directly from call/SMS logs.
* Enables blocking lost or stolen phones using IMEI, preventing misuse.
* Verifies mobile connections registered in a person’s name to detect unauthorized SIMs.
* Helps identify fake or cloned devices through IMEI verification.
* Provides official helpline verification to avoid scam calls.
* Includes features for reporting international spoofed calls and locating local internet providers.
* Strengthens telecom security and digital privacy within the framework of cyber laws, based on user consent.
(2) Cons:
The app’s permissions raise significant privacy concerns. Its access includes:
* Reading SMS/MMS and their contents.
* Reading call logs, phone status, and device identity.
* Accessing the device’s gallery and USB storage.
* Modifying or deleting storage contents.
* Taking pictures or videos using the camera.
* Viewing network connections.
* Controlling the flashlight.
These broad permissions create a perception of overreach, especially when linked to a government-related platform.
SANCHAR SAATHI AND THE K.S. PUTTASWAMY PRIVACY JUDGMENT
The landmark ruling in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs. Union of India (2017) clearly established privacy as a fundamental right under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The Court determined that any intrusion into privacy must meet a four-part proportionality test:
1. Legality—backed by valid law.
2. Legitimate State purpose.
3. Necessity—only what is essential for achieving the goal.
4. Proportionality—minimal intrusion relative to the objective.
This ruling created the constitutional foundation for all future digital privacy disputes.
Applying these standards to Sanchar Saathi reveals serious concerns. Any effort to mandate installation or require involuntary data-sharing would fail the legality requirement since no specific law allows such deep surveillance.
Moreover, even if preventing telecom fraud is a legitimate aim, continuous access to the camera, storage, call logs, or messages is disproportionate. These permissions go beyond what is necessary for fraud detection.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the State must reduce rather than increase the collection of personal data.
THE POSSIBILITY OF MISUSE
Sanchar Saathi’s design poses multiple risks without adequate safeguards:
(a) Function creep: Tools developed for fraud prevention could later be used for surveillance or profiling, as seen globally in cases like the Pegasus spyware scandal.
(b) Unauthorized access: Weak data-retention or sharing policies could allow employees, contractors, or third parties to access sensitive information.
(c) Lack of oversight: Without independent audits, collected metadata and device information could be misused to track communication patterns or personal movements.
(d) Centralized vulnerability: Any large phone user database is a prime target for cyberattacks. A breach could expose millions to fraud, impersonation, or targeted harassment.
WHY SANCHAR SAATHI REQUIRES HIGHER SCRUTINY THAN SOCIAL MEDIA APPS?
A common argument is: “You already share your data with WhatsApp and Facebook, so why object when the government asks?”
This comparison is fundamentally flawed:
1. Consent vs. Coercion
Sanchar Saathi was initially positioned to appear mandatory, with reports of pre-installation on new devices and no ability to uninstall. This turns consent into coercion. Unlike private apps, citizens cannot realistically opt out of a government-linked service without facing consequences.
2. State power vs. corporate influence
Private companies may target ads, but the State can arrest, tax, prosecute, surveil, and regulate. The outcomes of State access to personal data are therefore significantly more severe.
3. No app needs 24/7 access to camera/microphone
Even the most invasive social media apps do not engage in continuous background surveillance with State-backed immunity. Constitutional standards require strict necessity—an obligation that Sanchar Saathi may not satisfy.
4. Fundamental rights cannot be waived
The Supreme Court in Puttaswamy ruled that individuals cannot waive their fundamental rights. Sharing data with private apps does not give the State permission to violate privacy.
Therefore, equating government data access with private data misuse is a legally unsound and logically flawed argument.
BOTTOM LINE
Growing fear around digital surveillance has led some citizens to think about abandoning smartphones for simpler devices. However, this shift only offers an illusion of security—SIM cards, telecom networks, and cell-site triangulation remain open to legal interception, no matter the device.
According to the Puttaswamy ruling, the responsibility for protecting privacy does not rest with citizens altering their lifestyle. It lies with the State, which must ensure that any intrusion is legal, necessary, proportionate, and transparent.
Citizens should not be forced to give up vital digital services—banking, identity verification, healthcare, education, navigation—to protect their privacy. Privacy belongs to the person, not the device.
Thus, the solution is not to regress technologically but to reform legally: enforce stronger data-protection laws, establish independent oversight, implement transparency requirements, create accountability mechanisms, and design State digital systems that respect privacy.
Ultimately, while Sanchar Saathi seeks to be a digital guardian against cyber fraud, its intrusive permissions and structural weaknesses raise the alarming possibility that it may serve as a surveillance tool.
Written by-
1. Sathi Ghosh (Intern)
Heritage Law College, Kolkata
2. Ahan Mandal (Intern)
Symbiosis Law School, Noida
