Introduction
In the Indian legal system, the judiciary adheres to established rules for interpreting statutory texts. The most fundamental among these is the literal rule, wherein courts assign words their ordinary, everyday meaning. When statutory language is unambiguous, courts apply it as written—regardless of the outcomes—on the presumption that Parliament’s intent is manifest in the words it uses.
However, strict literalism may lead to results that are absurd or contrary to legislative purpose. To counter this, courts apply the golden rule—starting with the literal meaning but modifying it marginally if it leads to an irrational or unjust outcome. The underlying presumption is that the legislature did not intend absurd consequences, and the law’s language can be tempered to fulfill its purpose more faithfully.
For older statutes, courts sometimes invoke the mischief rule (also known as Heydon’s rule). This approach examines the legislative intent by identifying the specific problem the statute sought to address, and interprets provisions in a way that remedies the mischief. For instance, an anti-pollution statute originally targeting coal smoke may be interpreted to cover similar pollutants from modern sources, aligning judicial reading with the evolving context.
Purposive Interpretation in Contemporary Jurisprudence
In recent decades, the Indian judiciary has moved toward a purposive approach, favouring interpretation that advances legislative objectives over strict textualism. Instead of parsing words in isolation, courts consider the broader purpose and social context of the statute. A purposive reading allows courts to suppress the mischief targeted by the law and ensure that its benefits reach the intended beneficiaries.
This shift is especially visible in constitutional interpretation. For instance, Article 21—originally understood to protect life and personal liberty—has been expansively interpreted to include rights to privacy, health, livelihood, and procedural fairness. By focusing on the purpose and spirit of constitutional provisions, the judiciary has ensured that these rights evolve with societal needs.
A recent insolvency ruling aptly illustrates the divergence between literal and purposive readings. The Supreme Court observed that the outcome of the case would differ entirely depending on whether a clause was interpreted textually or teleologically. While the majority favoured a strict reading, the dissent emphasized flexibility to preserve the law’s functional intent.
Still, Indian courts are cautious not to overstep. Judges frequently reiterate their commitment to legislative intent and employ interpretive doctrines to stay within the bounds of parliamentary sovereignty. As legal scholars note, such doctrines ensure laws are applied “in a way that aligns with their intended purpose,” without allowing judicial creativity to amount to judicial legislation. The judiciary thus walks a fine line—ensuring laws serve justice without assuming the role of the legislature.
Classical Canons of Interpretation
Several interpretive canons are used by Indian courts to decode legislative language and preserve legislative intent:
1. Ejusdem Generis (Of the Same Kind)
When a statute lists specific terms followed by a general one, the general term is interpreted as covering only items similar to those specifically listed. For example, in the phrase “cars, trucks, motorcycles, and other motor vehicles,” the general term is read to include only similar land-based vehicles—not ships or aircraft. This rule ensures general words do not defeat the precision of specific examples.
2. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius (The Express Mention of One Thing Excludes the Other)
This maxim suggests that if the legislature explicitly mentions certain items, it intended to exclude those not listed. For instance, if a statute says “only doctors and nurses are permitted,” it is presumed that other healthcare professionals are intentionally excluded. This principle protects the exclusivity of specific legislative choices and prevents courts from reading in unintended meanings.
3. Noscitur a Sociis (A Word is Known by the Company It Keeps)
When a term is ambiguous, its meaning is inferred from the surrounding words. For example, in “cars, trucks, and other vehicles,” the term “vehicles” would be interpreted in line with the more specific terms preceding it. This avoids interpretations that take words far outside their context and guards against over-expansion of meaning.
Together, these canons ground interpretation in context and help avoid judicial overreach. As recent legal commentary suggests, such tools are indispensable in navigating ambiguous statutes and ensuring that judicial interpretation remains faithful to legislative design.
Landmark Supreme Court Judgments
A number of significant rulings by the Supreme Court of India exemplify these interpretive strategies in action:
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)
This landmark decision enunciated the basic structure doctrine, holding that while Parliament may amend the Constitution under Article 368, it cannot alter its essential features. The ruling went beyond a textual reading to preserve the Constitution’s core values, such as secularism, rule of law, and judicial review. The Court thus elevated constitutional principles over legislative supremacy when the two came into conflict.
T. Venkata Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1985)
The issue here was whether an ordinance issued by the executive enjoys the same legal force as legislation passed by Parliament. The Court affirmed that ordinances are equivalent to laws and must meet all constitutional standards. This ruling reinforced that executive convenience cannot bypass constitutional safeguards, thereby harmonizing the ordinance-making power with legislative principles.
Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017)
In this case, the Court invalidated the practice of instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat) on the grounds that it violated Muslim women’s fundamental rights to equality and dignity. Although personal law permitted the practice, the Court used a purposive and rights-based approach to strike it down, holding that it was not an essential religious practice and failed the test of constitutional morality.
Independent Sugar Corp. v. Juneja (2024)
This recent insolvency case illustrated the interpretive divide within the judiciary. A majority of the Court adhered to a literal reading of a statutory provision, while the dissent adopted a purposive approach that considered practical and economic implications. The split judgment underlined how interpretive philosophy can decisively affect legal outcomes.
Other transformative rulings—such as Puttaswamy (Right to Privacy, 2017), Navtej Singh Johar (Decriminalization of Section 377, 2018), and decisions expanding the right to health during the COVID-19 pandemic—have similarly demonstrated the judiciary’s willingness to interpret older laws in light of present-day constitutional values and social realities.
Challenges in Statutory Interpretation
Indian courts often face complex hurdles while interpreting statutes:
1. Ambiguity and Vague Drafting
Many Indian laws use outdated or imprecise language, leading to confusion about their scope. For example, early statutes may use the word “person” without clarifying if it includes corporations, women, or minors. Without clarity, judges must rely on interpretive principles—sometimes leading to inconsistent results.
2. Outmoded or Colonial Legislation
A large number of Indian laws date back to the colonial period. These statutes reflect outdated assumptions and are often silent on modern concerns. For instance, early telegraph laws did not contemplate digital communication. Courts must then decide whether to expand the statute’s meaning or leave its revision to the legislature. This tension between judicial interpretation and legislative inertia can be problematic.
3. Rapid Societal Change
Social values evolve quickly, often outpacing legislative reform. Issues such as gender identity, data privacy, environmental sustainability, and technological innovation demand legal responses that older statutes may not anticipate. Courts, therefore, often stretch the law to accommodate these needs, guided by constitutional principles of equality, liberty, and dignity. However, this expansion risks blurring the line between interpreting and rewriting the law—a balance the judiciary must vigilantly maintain.
Conclusion
The Indian judiciary employs a nuanced blend of textual and purposive interpretation to enforce and adapt laws to the needs of a changing society. While doctrines like ejusdem generis, expressio unius, and noscitur a sociis provide structured frameworks to decipher legislative language, the broader judicial trend has been to look beyond mere words and into the purpose, context, and values underpinning the law.
Landmark rulings have shown that courts are often willing to move beyond the text when necessary to protect constitutional guarantees. Yet, they remain conscious of the limits of their role, ensuring that legislative supremacy is not undermined by interpretive overreach.
Ultimately, statutory interpretation in India is not a mechanical exercise but a dynamic process that seeks to preserve the rule of law, uphold constitutional morality, and ensure that justice is not defeated by literalism.
